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ABSTRACT 
The construction of a large dam is often a contested and controversial matter. Delicate aspects 
related to the dam construction business such as the resettlement of peoples, environmental impact 
and financial costs, can trigger popular discontent and hinder the realisation of a particular project. By 
advancing the notion of the hydropolis, a reinterpretation of Hannah Arendt (1958) definition of the 
polis, this paper will explore how ruling elites can manipulate the public opinion to politically 
construct a large dam as a foreign policy matter. This, it will be argued, serves to conceal the negative 
consequences of a dam so that issues related to its social and environmental impact are removed from 
the national political debate. Specifically, the case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) 
in Ethiopia will be used to illustrate how a large dam can become a geopolitical object grounded on 
the friend/enemy distinction, in the context of the longstanding geopolitical tensions in the Nile River 
Basin.  
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INTRODUCTION 
On March 25, 2015, fans were cheering as the players of Welayta Dicha (an Ethiopian Football 
Club based in Sodo) lifted the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (henceforth GERD) Cup, a national 
football tournament that they had recently won. Whilst the tournament’s name might appear 
surprising to some, it is perhaps less so to those familiar with recent Ethiopian political developments. 
In 2011, when the Ethiopian government started the construction of the GERD – on paper the largest 
dam in Africa – it also launched a parallel campaign aimed at making of the dam a patriotic project 
symbolising the renaissance of the Ethiopian nation after the atrocities committed by the Derg1, a 
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military junta that ruled the country from 1974 to 1987. The campaign has arguably been successful 
(Menga, 2016b), and  the Ethiopian leadership presented the dam as a foreign policy matter, targeting 
Ethiopian nationals regardless of national borders or federal boundaries. 
The political discourse generated by the GERD offers a good platform to illustrate that, in line 
with a changing and globalised world with deepening time-space compression (Harvey, 1999), the 
space of appearance in hydropolitics has expanded to encompass political and administrative 
boundaries. By advancing the notion of the hydropolis, a reinterpretation of Hannah Arendt (1958) 
definition of the polis2, understood in philosophical terms as a metaphor for the space of political 
appearance, this article will explore how ruling elites deliberately construct a large dam as a foreign 
policy matter to deproblematise its environmental and societal consequences.  
Through an implementation of the discursive practice of othering and the framing of an issue in 
antagonistic terms as a friend/enemy one, a ruling elite can remove a particular issue from the political 
debate pre-empting the arousal of dissent. This will be demonstrated through an application to recent 
developments in the Nile River Basin. With regards to the Ethiopian ruling elite, the paper will show 
that its geopolitical imagination of the polis, the hydropolis, is grounded on the friend/enemy 
distinction and on the consequent spatial assumption that politics takes place wherever the enemy and 
the friend are co-located. 
In concrete terms, this practice is relevant to the Ethiopian ruling class for at least three reasons. 
First, and in line with the Latin metonymic panem et circenses (bread and circuses), framing a 
domestic issue as a foreign policy one can serve to distract public attention from other pressing 
matters. Delicate aspects related to the dam construction business such as the resettlement of peoples, 
environmental impact and financial costs, can be concealed by a rhetoric that overemphasizes a 
foreign policy success, which in the case of Ethiopia is that the GERD is being built in spite of the 
opposition coming from Egypt and, to a lesser extent, Sudan. Second, and consequently, the prestige 
stemming from this endeavour can help legitimate the ruling elite and bolster popular support. Indeed, 
even though Ethiopia is an authoritarian regime (Abbink & Hagmann, 2013), the government needs 
the support of its people to ensure its survival. As Arendt (1958: 200) observed, power “springs up 
between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse”, and thus, power, just 
like hydroelectricity, cannot be stored for the future but needs to be constantly generated and renewed. 
Third, this can help attract the significant and wealthy Ethiopian diaspora abroad, who are crucial to 
the funding of the GERD’s construction in their purchase of dam bonds.  
Hence, this article serves two principal purposes. The first, and more general, is to reflect on 
politics and on how the space of appearance should be treated in critical hydropolitical studies. By 
doing so, it contributes to both literature on critical hydropolitics (Sneddon and Fox, 2006; Mustafa, 
2007; Warner and Zeitoun, 2008; Harris and Alatout, 2010; Akhter, 2015; Hirsch, 2016), and critical 
geopolitics (Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992; Agnew, 2003; 2016; Dalby and Toal, 2006; Ó Tuathail, 
2010). The second, and more specific purpose, is to provide an account of how the Ethiopian ruling 
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elite has managed to frame the GERD as a foreign policy matter so that issues related to its social and 
environmental impact nearly disappeared from the national political debate. To illustrate how territory 
and society can be socially and politically constructed, the research perspective informing this article 
is based on discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 2006), with a focus on the ruling political elite in Ethiopia 
and on their discourses around the GERD. As Müller (2008) eloquently illustrated, discourses (and if 
we are to transcend the structure/agency dualism, also practices) emerge as a central form of power in 
the constitution of geopolitical identities.  
The sources used include both official and non-official documents. On the one hand, official 
documents include speeches and declarations delivered by high-level politicians at national and 
international summits, official statements and government documents. These documents were 
gathered through the following sources: the official websites of the Ethiopian Prime Minister, of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Ministry of Water Resources; archival research at the African 
Union Commission Library in Addis Ababa; the United Nations Bibliographic Information System; 
the official Facebook page of the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ethiopian Mission to the 
European Union in Brussels and to the United Nations in New York,  and of the Ethiopian Embassy in 
London; the monthly publication of the Ethiopian Embassy in London, Ethiopian News; the 
government-owned website grandmillenniumdam.net3 and the website meleszenawi.org.uk. On the 
other hand, non-official documents consist of news reports produced by the national tightly controlled 
media, which serve as the mouthpiece of the government. These sources, which were scrutinised 
using ‘LexisNexis’ and ‘BBC Monitoring Africa – Political’, include: the English translation of the 
Amharic transcripts of the evening news programme from the state-owned television channel EBC 
(Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation) and from the Ethiopian Radio and Television Agency (ERTA); 
reports from the pro-Ethiopian government Walta Information Centre website; and the weekly 
newspaper The Reporter. The period analysed starts in January 2010, the year before the launch of the 
construction of the GERD, and ends in December 2015. Further data was collected through phone 
interviews carried out between January and July 2016 and field work in the Ethiopian capital Addis 
Ababa between May and June 2016. During this time, semi-structured interviews and informal 
conversations were conducted with representatives from both the Ethiopian and the expatriate 
community. 
The rest of this paper is divided into four sections. The next section situates the paper at the 
intersection of the scholarship on critical geopolitics, critical hydropolitics and critical water 
geography, to then offer theoretical insights on the notion of the polis and of its reinterpretation, the 
hydropolis. The third section provides an overview of water politics in the Nile River Basin, while the 
fourth section connects the theory to the empirical to illustrate how the GERD was framed as a 
foreign policy matter by the Ethiopian ruling elite. The final section discusses how the findings of this 
paper can be applied to future research in the field of transboundary water relations.  
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ON WATER, POLITICS AND THE POLIS 
Before embarking upon a discussion on politics and the polis, it is necessary to position this article 
at the intersection of the scholarship on critical geopolitics, critical hydropolitics and critical water 
geography. In doing so this section will highlight how spatial and geographical constructions can 
influence foreign policy making and prepare the ground for our exploration of the political in water 
politics. Critical geopolitics can indeed be defined as the study of myriad geographical assumptions 
and schemas that influence the making of foreign policy and world politics (Agnew, 2016). As Agnew 
notes, “these assumptions and schemas are seen as socially constructed by particular people in 
different historical–geographical circumstances and as thereby providing the basis for geopolitical 
rationales to social and political purposes that are anything but simple reflections of a natural 
geopolitical order.” (Agnew, 2016:19). The early work on critical geopolitics (Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 
1992) identified three categories involved in the production of these discursive assumptions and the 
consequent spatialization of international politics: i) the formal geopolitical reasoning of strategic 
thinkers and public intellectuals; ii)  the practical geopolitical reasoning of politicians, statespersons, 
and journalists; and iii) the reasoning in contemporary popular culture. While these three categories 
are closely intertwined, Kuus (2010) observed that practical geopolitics offers a particularly effective 
analytical focus since it combines elements of formal geopolitical reasoning with societal elements 
and metaphors from popular culture. Through practical geopolitical reasoning, the intellectuals of 
statecraft - a notion that recalls Gramsci’s (1975) idea of the organic intellectuals4 - designate a world 
that is populated by various subjects, representations and histories often centred on binary distinctions 
and narratives (Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992). In this geopolitical imagination, discourses and 
ideological processes serve to construct the idea of the ‘self’, or the domestic, as juxtaposed to the 
‘other’, which is often represented as a threat (Dalby, 1990). This discursive practice of othering 
(Gregory, 1994) can be for instance based on competing visualisations of global space (Agnew, 
2003), or on temporal ideas of ‘backwardness’, such as the ones originating from colonial encounters 
and evident in the discursive practice of “Orientalism” (Said, 1979), or those stemming from a 
comparison with the self's own past (Said, 2000; Diez, 2010).  
Critical geopolitics challenges the deterministic formulations on geopolitical rivalries and “the 
geographical reasoning used in the legitimizations of contemporary warfare” (Dalby, 2010: 288), thus 
offering an alternative and more nuanced reading on how the intellectuals of statecraft shape foreign 
policy. This view resonates with current debates on critical hydropolitics, a notion advanced by 
Sneddon and Fox (2006) to question the dominant dichotomous approach on inter-state cooperation 
and conflict in the transboundary waters literature. A critical hydropolitics implies an engagement of 
critical geopolitics with the natural and ‘real world’ (Sneddon and Fox 2006: 184), to go beyond the 
water wars scenario and the analytical aridity of the Malthusian and cornucopian approaches toward 
the management of transboundary water resources. In the context of transboundary river basins, it is 
thus acknowledged that the geographical position of a basin riparian is less of a determining factor 
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than the use of power (Mirumachi, 2015), as such hegemonic relations and power asymmetries need 
to be considered to understand transboundary water politics (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; Zeitoun et 
al., 2011, 2016; Menga, 2016a). As Menga and Mirumachi (2016: 375) observed, transboundary 
water relations are influenced by “discursive framings of the environment and social construction of 
goals of river basin development and cooperative arrangements for such”.  
While critical hydropolitical studies have explored the way actors construct geographical scales, 
especially in relation with the domestic-foreign polarity (Warner & Zawahri, 2012; Warner, 2012; 
Menga, 2016b), it is critical water geography that excavated the discursive construction of rivers as 
complex sociotechnical processes (Akhter, 2015). Research has highlighted how ruling political elites 
can preserve social control and disseminate ideas of modernization through the realisation of 
hydraulic infrastructures such as dams, canals and irrigation channels (Swyngedouw; 1999; Kaika, 
2006; Giglioli & Swyngedouw 2008). The political constructions of scales can further our 
understanding of water politics (Biro, 2007; Alatout, 2008; Feitelson & Fischendler, 2009). 
Swyngedouw (2004a) formulated the concepts of hydro-social territory and waterscape to explore 
how scales can be constructed by a national elite, becoming “arenas around which socio-spatial power 
choreographies are enacted and performed” (Swyngedouw, 2004b: 28). Water can shape social 
relations beyond the watershed scale (Budds & Hinojosa, 2012), and scalar negotiations and 
constructions of water can play a central role in state-consolidation (Harris & Alatout, 2010).  
Thanks to the advancement of critical water studies, water is no longer seen as a merely technical 
issue. Water resources management is an inherently political process (Mollinga, 2008; Wegerich & 
Warner, 2010), where transboundary watersheds become problemsheds (Allan, 2001) in which 
diverging narratives are socially and politically constructed (Norman et al., 2016). Through top-down 
means, river basins can be constructed as unique spatial entities where geopolitical objectives unfold 
(Sneddon & Fox, 2016). If we accept that water issues are inexorably political issues (Swyngedouw, 
2013), we also need to understand how contested and controversial hydraulic developments are 
constructed as geopolitical objects to remove them from the political debate. To explore how this 
process can take place in hydropolitics, we now need to turn our attention to some theoretical 
considerations on the space of appearance in politics.  
As Norberto Bobbio succinctly defined it in Il dizionario di politica (Bobbio et al., 2004), politics 
is the activity of bringing together and defending our friends, and disaggregating and fighting our 
enemies. This binary definition based on the friend/enemy distinction is inspired by Carl Schmitt 
(2007: 26), who claimed that “the specific political distinction … is that between friend and enemy” 
in the public sphere, with war (the polemos) being the most extreme form of this antagonism in an 
essentially dyadic view of politics (Bobbio, 1994). While defining politics and the ‘political’ remains 
an essentially controversial and contestable matter, the above perspective has two significant 
implications for the current study. The first is that politics involves a conflictual relationship between 
at least two groups (the friend and the enemy, the known and the unknown), while the second is that 
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political interactions are based on perceptions and appearances. Furthermore, and inevitably, if we 
focus on appearances we are implying that there is a spatial dimension of politics, an arena where 
politics happen.  
This arena within which politics is conducted, and from where the word politics in itself derives, is 
the polis, the ancient Greek word meaning ‘city-state’. The meaning of the word polis, however, goes 
well beyond that of a mere city or of a state, and deserves to be further interrogated. As Elden (2000: 
415) thoughtfully illustrated in his reading of Heidegger, we “could not use our understanding of the 
political to explain the πόλις [polis], but, as the political derives from the πόλις [polis], we can use our 
understanding of πόλις [polis] to rethink the political”. The polis therefore emerges as a site of being 
for the political, as a space of interaction between various groups. 
 This brings us closer to Arendt’s understanding of the polis and of the space of appearance. It is in 
The Human Condition that Arendt (1958) introduced in detail her view of the world as a public stage, 
exploring how the political realm is constituted directly by human plurality. Arendt argued (1958: 
198) that “the polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the 
organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies 
between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be”. Pericle’s 
exhortation to the Athenians, “wherever you go, you will be a polis”, is used by Arendt to explain that 
action and speech can create space almost anytime and everywhere. The space of appearance, Arendt 
adds (1958: 199), “comes into being wherever men are together in the manner of speech and action, 
and therefore predates and precedes all formal constitution of the public realm and the various forms 
of government, that is, the various forms in which the public realm can be organized”. 
Besides the recognition that actions and discourses can constitute a polis, what is important in 
Arendt’s argument is her understanding of the world as a public stage, something that, as Tavani 
explained (2013: 467), allows us to reflect on its “phenomenal nature” and on the coincidence 
between being and appearing. As Arendt later clarified in On Revolution  (2006: 98), “in politics, 
more than anywhere else, we have no possibility of distinguishing, between being and appearance. In 
the realm of human affairs, being and appearance are indeed one and the same.” Therefore, 
appearance – which in this case we should interpret as the rhetorical discursive projection of a specific 
political imagination – becomes the constitutive element of reality and of the polis. At any moment in 
time, adds Zerilli (2005: 20), a physical space can be transformed into a political one, even though 
this space of appearance exists “only so long as people are engaged in speech and action”. A transient 
and mutable nature of the space of appearance thus arises, from which we can infer that its spatial 
extent also varies as time goes by.  
One important point needs to be made to appreciate the mechanism through which a ruling elite 
can frustrate political action by changing the appearance of something. While, on the one hand, the 
polis can be viewed as the central space of political encounter where interactions between various 
groups take place, on the other hand, it is also the arena within which politics is conducted, and 
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where, therefore, speech and action can also be manipulated. The polis can thus, in turn, be predated 
by those in power to foreclose political encounter, and as a result, politics frustrates the political, with 
the latter being understood as “the space for the arrangement of egalitarian public encounter of 
heterogeneous groups and individuals” (Swyngedouw, 2014: 123). Under this perspective, the 
original Arendtian normative argument that the polis has the potential for horizontally advancing 
common will formation, is corrupted by means of a political and ideological construction that hinders 
political encounter and confrontation.  
For the purpose of this work, the term hydropolis denotes the application of the notion of the polis 
to the domain of water politics and hydraulic development. Rather than providing a normative 
connotation, the ‘hydro’ qualifier merely has the etymological role of prompting a discussion on the 
necessity to study politics and the political in the field of hydropolitics and critical geopolitics. This 
serves to illustrate that just like the polis can be twisted, so does the hydropolis, which in this case 
emerges as a manipulated political space where a particular issue is removed from the public debate to 
pre-empt the opportunity for internal dissent to arise.  
A reinterpretation of the polis has at least two main implications for the study of water politics. 
First, if we consider the polis as the site of being for the political and as an abstract entity whose space 
lies between groups being together, we can deduce that politics happens, potentially, in any place 
where friends or enemies are located, regardless of state boundaries. In line with the long-term 
tendency identified by Agnew (2003), the spatiality of politics in the contemporary world seems to be 
based on the model of an integrated world society where social groupings are the main actors. 
However, rather than talking about a ‘global polis’, as suggested by Neufeld (1995), it is more 
appropriate to refer to a ‘glocal polis’, after Swyngedouw’s (2004b) notion of glocalization used to 
indicate the simultaneous local and global reach of political activities. Under this framing, the 
hydropolis emerges as a seemingly borderless arena of political encounter which is nevertheless 
anchored to local, and at times very material, elements. Let us take, for example, the issue of 
hydraulic development. A physical object such as a large hydroelectric dam occupies a well-defined 
geographical space and has a number of manifest consequences at various levels. For local 
populations, these will include landscape changes, loss of cultural heritage sites, and resettlement 
policies. At the country level, a large dam will have an impact on state budgets, irrigated land, flood 
control, and electricity generation. At the wider river basin level, a large dam will influence the 
amount of water flowing to other basin riparians, and consequently will have strategic and 
geopolitical consequences for the parties involved. In our understanding of the hydropolis, ruling 
politicians will transform the physical space occupied by a large dam into a political one whose 
spatial extent cannot be demarcated in any other way other than by that defined by their space of 
appearance. A ruling elite will set the hydropolis wherever the recipients of its speeches and actions 
are located, on the basis of their political imaginations and assumptions. 
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The second implication lies in the fact that the condition of plurality associated to the polis, its 
same existence, originates from and is preserved by the use of power, as without power the space of 
appearance will rapidly fade away (Arendt, 1958). Arendt’s idea that power only exists as a potential 
that needs to be constantly actualised allows us to bring to the surface important matters such as the 
contested nature of the nation (Harris and Alatout, 2010), and the processes behind the political 
construction of scale. Research has indeed shown that governments can adopt a nationalistic rhetoric 
in which the construction of internationally contested hydraulic infrastructures becomes a way to both 
assert power over an antagonist neighbour, and legitimise and consolidate their grip on power 
(Worster, 1985; Mitchell, 2002;  Menga, 2015). The friend/enemy distinction thus becomes a 
constituting element of the hydropolis, defining the nature of the space of appearance. Arendt 
therefore encounters Schmitt, and while the compatibility between the two is arguably not as evident 
as Kalivas (2008) suggested (for a critique refer to Ackerman, 2011), Arendt (1996) did explore the 
distinction between self and neighbour and the ways in which, in our “concrete worldly existence” 
(Arendt: 1996: 94), we can give to our neighbour a meaning of friend or enemy.   
In more practical terms, the notion of the hydropolis lets us appreciate the processes through which 
ruling elites can deproblematise the environmental and societal consequences that come with the 
construction of a large hydraulic infrastructure. The shift from the local to the global is part of a move 
aimed at stretching the space of appearance, so that a domestic issue becomes a foreign policy one 
and serves as a distraction from other matters. In the case of Ethiopia and the GERD, this study will 
show how the Ethiopian leadership has drawn its space of political appearance along the lines of an 
imagined Ethiopian nation, with a conception of the polis grounded on the friend/enemy distinction 
epitomised by their rivalry with Egypt. The social groupings acting in this public stage reflect the 
hydropolitical tensions that marked the Nile River Basin during the last two decades. The spatial 
extent of the hydropolis might however change in the future as new power dynamics unfold, and I 
will return to this point in the penultimate section of this paper.  
To contextualise the upcoming discussion, the next section provides a brief overview of 
hydropolitics in the Nile River Basin, illustrating the main characteristics of the GERD along with its 
political and environmental impact on Ethiopia and its neighbours.  
 
 
WATER POLITICS IN THE NILE RIVER BASIN 
And I think that their account of the country was true. For even if a man has not heard it before, he 
can readily see, if he has sense, that that Egypt to which the Greeks sail is land deposited for the 
Egyptians, the river's gift—not only the lower country, but even the land as far as three days' voyage 
above the lake, which is of the same nature as the other, although the priests did not say this, too. 
Herodotus, 1920, 2.5.1 
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These are the words that Herodotus used in the 5th century B.C. to describe the importance of the 
Nile River for Egypt. The enunciation “Egypt is the gift of the Nile” has actually become one of the 
general premises adopted by analysts, scholars, and practitioners to open their writings on water 
politics in the Nile River Basin. And Egypt, on its account, has indeed based its demands over the 
Nile on the assumption that the country has natural and historical rights to its waters (Cascao, 2009). 
However, besides being a gift for Egypt, the Nile is also the world’s longest river, and eleven 
countries share the water of its two main tributaries, the White Nile and the Blue Nile: Burundi, DR 
Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, The Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. 
Among them, Egypt is both the most downstream and the most dependent on the river, and without its 
water the country would be a desert. In 1959, Egypt and Sudan signed the Agreement for the Full 
Utilisation of the Nile Waters, which allocated 55.5 Billion Cubic Meters (BCM) of water to Egypt 
and 18.5 BCM to Sudan, and thus institutionalised the former’s historical demands over the Nile. This 
colonial-era agreement (for a comprehensive account of the politics of the Nile River Basin in the 
colonial age refer to Tvedt, 2004), which is not recognised by the other riparians who had been, de 
facto, excluded from regional water politics, also led to the construction of the grandiose Aswan High 
Dam in the 1960s, which gave Egypt control of a large part of the flow of the Nile and became the 
country’s “centerepiece of postwar nation making” (Mitchell 2002, 45). 
Egypt has dominated hydropolitics in the region, and a large part of the scholarship on the Nile has 
focused on Egypt and on its role in the basin (among others Smith & AI-Rawahy, 1990; Beinin & 
Lockman, 1998: Kendie, 1999; Vasunia, 2001; Mitchell, 2002). Things have however changed during 
the last decade, and the Egyptian hegemony over the Nile is being challenged by the other basin 
riparians, as if they were retrospectively asking Herodotus “whose gift is the Nile anyway?” (Ibrahim, 
2010: 284). In 1999, the establishment of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), an intergovernmental 
partnership between the Nile Basin countries supported by the World Bank (WB), seemed to herald a 
new era of cooperation in the basin, even though its effectiveness has been questioned (Swain, 2002). 
The NBI has nevertheless served as a platform to negotiate the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework 
Agreement (CFA) (Mekonnen, 2010), a legal instrument through which six of the Nile upper riparians 
(Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya and Burundi) are claiming their rights over the waters 
of the Nile (Ibrahim, 2010). The CFA has crystallised tensions between the upper riparians and the 
lower ones, Egypt and Sudan, which are worried that this will lead to the construction of more dams 
upstream and a consequent reduction in their water flow (Salman, 2013). Indeed, in the past Egypt 
threatened to go to war if Ethiopia tried to build dams on the Blue Nile. In 1979, the Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat famously said that “the only matter that could take Egypt to war again is 
water” (quoted in Starr, 1991:19), adding one year later that “If Ethiopia takes any action to block our 
right to the Nile water, there will be no alternative for us but to use force” (quoted in Krishna, 1988).  
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As Fred Pearce (2015) observed, this threat worked until 2011 but then, when Egypt was going 
through the turbulences of the Arab Spring, Ethiopia seized the moment and, without warning, began 
building the GERD on the Blue Nile. The launch of the GERD represents, according to many (among 
others Hammond, 2013; Chen & Swain, 2014; Yihdego et al., 2016), a turning point in water politics 
in the Nile River Basin, as it brings a change to the balance of power between its two most populous 
countries. It also led scholars and analysts to identify Ethiopia as the new emerging hegemon in 
Africa (Gebreluel, 2014: Verhoeven, 2015), and the journal Water International (2016) dedicated a 
special issue exclusively to the GERD. But what is it that makes the GERD so important? Why, for 
instance, the construction of the large Merowe Dam on the Blue Nile in Sudan in the 2000s did not 
get the same level of attention? Significantly, the GERD will be the first large dam on the Blue Nile to 
be built outside of Egypt and Sudan. It will also be the largest dam in Africa, measuring 1,800 m in 
length, 175 m in height and with a reservoir that will be able to store 10 Million Cubic Meters (MCM) 
of water (Salini Impregilo, n.d.). The dam is primarily designed to generate hydropower, and upon its 
completion, tentatively foreseen for 2018, it will generate 6,000 MW (Zhang et al., 2016), which will 
allow Ethiopia to quadruple its current installed electricity generating capacity of 2,000 MW, and to 
sell surplus electricity to its neighbours through the planned Eastern Africa Electricity Highway 
Project. The GERD thus acquired a symbolic value as a project that will help eradicate poverty in 
Ethiopia (Pearce, 2015), a country that in the 2000s had one of the highest poverty rates in the world 
(World Bank Group, 2015).  
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Figure 1: The Nile River Basin and its main dams in 2016. Source: Nick Scarle, Cartographic Unit, University of 
Manchester. 
Nevertheless, the GERD is also extremely controversial, as it is often the case with this kind of 
projects which inevitably have an impact at both the domestic and the international level (Menga, 
2016b). With a staggering cost estimated at US$5 billion (Hammond, 2013), the project impacts 
heavily on Ethiopia’s national budget, which in 2011/2012 amounted to US$8 billion (Reuters, 2011). 
According to Flyvbjerg and Ansar (2014), the GERD will more likely cost US$10 billion, and rather 
than “helping Ethiopia grow, the dam could drown the country's fragile economy in debt”. The 
Ethiopian government has decided to self-finance the project through its own resources and the sale of 
dam bonds, with citizens being reportedly pressured to invest on the GERD (Brookings, 2013). 
According to a 2013 report prepared by an International Panel of Experts (IPoE, 2013), the GERD 
12 
 
might also negatively impact on biodiversity and fisheries in both Ethiopia and Sudan, even though 
the studies carried out so far seem superficial and incomplete (International Rivers, 2014). The dam 
will also flood nearly 1,700 square kilometers of forest, leading to the forced resettlement of 
approximately 20,000 people, irreversible changes in the landscape, and the loss of cultural sites 
(International Rivers, 2014). This is an important point, as during the last few years resettlement 
policies in Ethiopia have sparked controversies. The construction of the Gilgel Gibe III Dam on the 
Omo River has for instance divided the local opinion, triggering debates on legitimate governance and 
raising harsh domestic criticisms voiced primarily through the Internet (Abbink, 2012). More recently, 
demonstrators took to the streets (four hundred of them were reportedly killed by Ethiopian security 
forces) in the Ethiopian region of Oromiya, to protest against the Integrated Addis Ababa Master Plan, 
which would displace thousands of Oromo farmers (BBC News, 2016). Furthermore, at the 
international level, the fact that the dam is under construction does not mean that Egypt is no longer 
opposing the project. In 2013, in the midst of an emblematic and rather embarrassing moment, 
Egyptian politicians were inadvertently caught on camera while discussing possible ways to sabotage 
the GERD, which included using the intelligence service to destroy it if all else failed (Tigrai Online, 
2013).  
In spite of its political authoritarianism, the government’s ambitious attempt to make Ethiopia a 
developmental state (Di Nunzio, 2015) forces it to seek legitimation and get popular support to 
maintain social order. As stated by a project officer working in the development sector in Addis 
Ababa, “Ethiopia knows that it needs donors, and to keep them [the donors] coming, the country 
needs to show that they can offer a stable business environment and that they can ensure a capillary 
control of the territory.” Popular unrest, therefore, needs to be avoided, especially when it comes to a 
flagship project like the GERD. Furthermore, dams tend to be surrounded by a rhetorical discourse 
that emphasises their contribution to a prosperous future and to the realisation of national goals while 
nurturing development and progress (Menga, 2015). This resonates well with the developmental 
discourse and broader ideas of state- and nation-building, while also meshing with the friend/enemy 
distinction, as it implies that those who support the dam are patriots, but those who don’t, are enemies 
of the nation. 
In a setting deeply marked by the historical rivalry between Ethiopia and Egypt, the GERD 
emerged as a geopolitical tool used by the Ethiopian government to assert its power and get 
legitimation. As the Egyptian scholar Rawia Tawfik (2016: 578) argued, the GERD “is presented as a 
sign of Ethiopia’s determinism to redress historical injustices in the utilization of the Nile’s water 
resources and exercise its right to use these resources, even if it would bear a heavy financial and 
political cost”. The Ethiopian government’s tight control of the media and of the Internet 
(Gagliardone, 2014) allowed it to undisputedly frame the GERD as a foreign policy issue, 
deproblematising its environmental and societal consequences, as the next section illustrates.  
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THE ETHIOPIAN HYDROPOLIS 
To understand the articulation of the geopolitical assumptions that led to the creation of the 
Ethiopian hydropolis, two factors need to be taken into consideration in addition to the historical 
hydropolitical rivalry with Egypt. The first is the large Ethiopian diaspora, which can be estimated to 
total nearly a million people and which continues to grow globally. The diaspora exercises a 
significant economic and political influence on the homeland (Lyons et al., 2007; Chacko & Gebre, 
2013), and is often called to financially contribute to the realisation of the GERD. The second are the 
challenges posed by ethnic federalism and a multi-ethnic society, which are being addressed by the 
Ethiopian government through the introduction of new idioms of nationhood such as the millennium5 
rhetoric (Lentz, 2013; Orlowska, 2013). The GERD, whose initial name was the Millennium Dam, 
emerged as a symbol of Ethiopian nationalism (Abdelhady et al., 2015), and as an object that 
embodies the reawakening of the Ethiopian nation and its achievement of pride and success (Menga, 
2016b). These elements are recurrent in the discourse maintained by the Ethiopian leadership, which 
made a shift from the local to the global in its imaginations and assumptions of the GERD. In line 
with the friend/enemy distinction, the recipients of its speeches and actions are located both within 
and outside the Ethiopian territory. The ‘friend’, in this particular narrative, is epitomised by the 
members of the Ethiopian nation, both in the diaspora and in the homeland, while the ‘enemy’ is 
personified by Egypt, to a minor extent Sudan, and in general by anyone opposing the construction of 
the dam.  
This discourse is disseminated through a wide array of channels including national newspapers, 
TV and Radio outlets, the Internet, and social networking sites. The latter, in particular (see Pinkerton 
et al., 2011), have created new political spaces and new ways of reconfiguring the world and its social 
relations, consistently widening the space of appearance of the Ethiopian leadership. For example, in 
2014, Ethiopia's Foreign Minister Dr Tedros Adhanom used his Ministry’s official Facebook account 
to expound his opinion on the GERD and the Nile River more in general. 
 
It is time to throw off the legacy of colonialism, which had bedevilled the exploitation of the Nile 
Basin for so long, and finally move into a new era of cooperation, with real and sustained 
development. … In the past, we have been unable to use the considerable natural resources with 
which Ethiopia is endowed ... we are finally in a position to begin to exploit these resources properly, 
in the interests of national development. It is, of course, our right to do so in a manner that is 
acceptable to international norms and standards. … A significant part of the problem has been that 
much of the comment [on the GERD from Egypt] is based on inaccurate claims and allegations. 
Indeed, Ethiopia has repeatedly gone above and beyond "the call of duty" in trying to assuage 
Egyptian concerns and to reach consensus over a more equitable allocation of the use of the Nile 
waters. 
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Adhanom, 2014 
 
This statement captures some of the key elements of the rhetoric surrounding the dam. Adhanom 
portrays the GERD as a tool to assert national interests and Ethiopia’s rights over the Nile. Egypt is an 
important part of this narrative, and is denoted as a somehow capricious part which continues to hold 
a biased position in spite of the efforts made by Ethiopia to accommodate the situation.   
Most of the assumptions and representations of the GERD maintained by the Ethiopian elite stem 
from the ideas and words of Meles Zenawi, a charismatic politician who was the Prime Minister of 
Ethiopia from 1995 until his death in 2012. Zenawi, who was defined by an Ethiopian diplomat as the 
mastermind behind the GERD (Jima, 2016), has indeed been instrumental in the genesis of the GERD 
both as a project and as a foreign policy matter. Already in 1998 Zenawi advanced the idea of 
building two large dams on the Nile, and while doing so he made numerous references to Egypt and 
its negative influence on the Nile, showing how his spatial imagination of the Nile was essentially 
based on the distinction between Ethiopia and Egypt (BBC, 1998). During the ceremony for the 
launch of the GERD, Zenawi accused Egypt of making “attempts to undercut Ethiopia’s efforts to 
secure funding to cover the cost of the project” (Zenawi, 2011). Soon after that, Zenawi addressed the 
Ethiopian Parliament on the matter, spending words of praise for Sudan’s cooperative approach, and 
blaming once more Egypt for its efforts to hinder Ethiopia’s dam projects.  
 
When we make a scientific assessment, an Egyptian invasion on Ethiopia is very small, but we cannot 
say it is zero. So, we should not lose sleep because of this small threat, but we need to make 
appropriate preparations to forestall the said threat. The solution is to live by supporting each other. 
So, it means we need to build our defence capability to ward off the said threat. 
Zenawi, 2011 
 
Zenawi clearly singled out Egypt as Ethiopia’s main threat and antagonist for the country, in one 
of the rare cases in which the tone used by the Ethiopian leadership seems securitised. However, 
rather than on securitisation (which implies the discursive construction of “a plot that includes 
existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out” [Buzan et al. 1998, 32–3]), the narrative 
adopted by the Ethiopian elite revolves around the discursive practice of othering and on a more 
subtle shift from the local to the global. Whether it is to clarify that “Ethiopia is not an enemy of the 
Egyptian people” (BBC, 2011a), or to explain to the Ethiopians citizens that the GERD is being built 
to eradicate poverty with benefit “not only for Ethiopia but also Egypt” (BBC, 2011b), Egypt is 
constantly brought into the discourse, even when this seems to be, arguably, unnecessary.  
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Ethiopian media accounts of the GERD also provide an extensive and varied array of examples of 
these discursive constructions. Media in Ethiopia indeed serve as the mouthpiece of the government 
and tend to reproduce the official discourse maintained by the Ethiopian government. In particular, 
the news programme of the main Ethiopian TV channel, EBC, proved to be instrumental in the 
framing of the GERD as a foreign policy issue. In the period 2011-2015 EBC provided nearly weekly 
updates on the construction of the dam, and equal attention was given to the involvement and support 
shown by diaspora Ethiopians. EBC has broadcast numerous reports of Ethiopians abroad (living, 
among others, in the US, Canada, Germany, Dubai, the UK, Zambia, Kenya, and Somaliland) that 
show their patriotism by buying or pledging to buy government bonds in support of the GERD. 
Diaspora Ethiopians as well as Ethiopians from various parts of the country are also often seen 
touring the construction site of the GERD (BBC, 2012a; BBC, 2012b; BBC, 2013b), or cheering at 
the GERD Cup whenever it tours the country.  
The reports from EBC TV tend, in general, to emphasise the international dimension of the dam 
also by underlining the interest and praise expressed by foreign head of states, diplomats, and scholars 
(BBC, 2014b; BBC, 2015a; BBC, 2015b). Ethiopian newspapers and news agencies also accurately 
reproduce the opinions expressed by the members of the Ethiopian government, and in the aftermath 
of the abovementioned leaked Egyptian recording, the Foreign Ministry Spokesman Dina Mufti urged 
them to play an even greater role in creating awareness on the benefits of the GERD for Egypt (BBC, 
2013a). Mufti subsequently added that Egyptian rulers and politicians were carrying out an agenda 
aimed at discrediting the Ethiopian government, using the GERD as a pretext to divert attention from 
their domestic political troubles (BBC, 2013c). These “enemy provocations”, as they were defined by 
a high-ranking official of the Ethiopian army (BBC, 2014a), are part of an “out of fashion water wars 
mentality”, said a representative of a large Ethiopian environmental agency, and yet they seem to 
mirror the geopolitical assumptions on the Nile River maintained by the same Ethiopian elite.  
Fekahmed Negash, a director at Ethiopia’s Water, Irrigation and Energy Ministry, accused Egypt 
of carrying out a smear campaign on the dam. “Many of the communication materials they are using 
are full of wrong and false statements”, he said, adding that “it is becoming clear now that Egyptian 
authorities are against the construction of the dam. Which implies that they are against the 
development of Ethiopia” (Walta, 2014). Besides Egypt, and as if it was essential to identify an 
enemy, the Embassy of Ethiopia in London observed that the current hydroelectric renaissance will 
help Ethiopia defeat its major enemy, poverty, just as the Ethiopian Empire defeated the Kingdom of 
Italy in Adwa in 1896 (Ethiopian Embassy in London, 2015). Likewise, Semegnew Bekele, the 
project manager of the GERD who in 2015 was elected Tigrai Online person of the year (Tigrai 
Online, 2016), stated that the GERD, like Adwa, will represent the determination of the Ethiopian 
people for future generations (Addis Fortune, 2013). 
What is missing in these accounts is a discussion on the environmental, societal or economic 
impacts of the GERD, something that has never been mentioned despite the significant coverage 
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devoted to the dam. Through a strategy arguably aimed at frustrating political action and avoiding 
protests, these issues have been removed from the political discourse and are only mentioned by 
opposition websites based abroad, such as Ethiomedia.com or Ecadforum.com. Ethiopian based 
journalists who criticised the project have been silenced. This was for instance the case of Reeyot 
Alemu, who in 2011 was accused of terrorism and arrested for having questioned Zenawi’s 
fundraising methods for the GERD (IWMF, 2015). The ruling elite has prevented alternative 
representations of water and energy use in Ethiopia from even entering the domestic political debate.  
As the dissident Ethiopian journalist Eskinder Nega  illustrated, Zenawi frantically promoted the 
GERD “to deflect attention from sporadic but persistent calls for democracy [as] he still romanticizes 
a world which broadly tolerates repression” (Nega, 2011). Alemayehu G. Mariam, an Ethiopian 
academic based in the United States, tellingly explains that whenever he asked commonsensical 
questions about the economic feasibility of the GERD, he was swamped by online comments accusing 
him of “treason against Ethiopia by siding with Egypt [since he] should have been a lot more careful 
before writing an article that … demonize the Ethiopian Government and devalue Ethiopia’s 
sovereignty on its own rivers” (Mariam, 2015). And indeed, if one for example looks at the comments 
generated by any post on the GERD published in the Facebook pages of the Ethiopia’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs or of Dr Tedros Adhanom, the tones are rather exacerbated and often pull into the 
discussion Egypt and matters related to the assertion of national pride. As a taxi driver in Addis 
Ababa effectively captured, “energy is important, Ethiopia needs energy, I need energy, but Egypt 
doesn’t want us to get energy”.  
The rhetorical discourse emanated by the Ethiopian leadership is thus reproduced by its same 
recipients, who seem to perceive the GERD primarily as an assertion of sovereignty in a polarised 
geopolitical arena dominated by the rivalry with Egypt. Even though the GERD is still under 
construction, its physical space (and impact) has been concealed and transformed into a political one 
created by the action and speech of those inhabiting the public space of appearance. The spatial extent 
of the Ethiopian hydropolis is defined by the power dynamics currently at play in the Nile River 
Basin, which find a nodal point in the issue of large-scale hydraulic development. In Arendtian terms, 
the GERD provides an example of how the permanent change produced by human work can create 
new political spaces and reconfigure the ways in which we negotiate and imagine the extent of our 
space of appearance. At present, this seemingly borderless arena of political encounter springs up 
from the binary dialectic based on the distinction between an imagined Ethiopian nation and its rival, 
Egypt. However, hydropolitics, or the geopolitics of river basins, are constantly shifting under the 
influence of different forces and needs (Hirsch, 2016). Thus, and in light of the rapidly evolving 
hydropolitical scenarios in the Nile River Basin evidenced by the near completion of the GERD, the 
nature and extent of the hydropolis are likely to change in the future along with the inevitable change 
in the power relations therein. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has reinterpreted Arendt’s (1958) conception of the polis to introduce the notion of the 
hydropolis. This served to shed light on the ways in which the Ethiopian leadership has transformed 
the physical space occupied by a large dam into a highly polarised geopolitical one. Based on its 
geopolitical perceptions on the Nile River, the Ethiopian elite has discursively constructed the GERD 
as a geopolitical object grounded on the friend/enemy distinction and on their rivalry with Egypt. 
Throughout the top-down imposition of a specific narrative, the space occupied by the hydropolis 
emerges as a seemingly borderless arena of political encounter configured around historical 
recriminations and the necessity, for those in power, to get legitimation and gain popular support.  
While, on the one hand, Elden (2000) observed that modern technology offered new ways to 
resolve a friend/enemy problem in the 20th century, on the other hand, it also seems to offer new 
means to nourish such issues in the 21st century. The Internet and social media have indeed been 
instrumental in the framing of the GERD and in reaching out to the large Ethiopian diaspora.  
Aside from the GERD, other large scale hydraulic infrastructures are at present causing several 
geopolitical conflicts globally. Examples include the large Xayaburi Dam on the Lower Mekong 
River, the Rogun Dam on the Vakhsh River, and the Myitsone Dam on the Irawaddy River. A critical 
approach that problematizes the notion of the political can improve our understanding of these 
conflicts and of the power dynamics behind them. The significant economic, environmental, and 
societal impacts of a large dam tend to be concealed by a thick layer of discourses created by their 
promoters. While Arendt’s formulation of the polis leaves little room for a discussion on the 
materiality of water (refer to Lavau, 2013; Grundy-Warr et al., 2015; Steinberg and Peters, 2015), the 
‘more-than-human’ is deeply enmeshed with dam development (as Mitchell [2002] tellingly 
illustrated in the case of the proliferation of the anopheles mosquito following the construction of the 
Aswan High Dam), and further studies should explore their interplay. Indeed, water, just like the 
space of appearance, is transient, mutable, and does not respect boundaries, and thus plays a central 
role in the stretching of the hydropolis. And yet, while the material effects of these infrastructures 
need to be discussed and studied, their ideological dimension is also important and deserves attention. 
Future research could build on the theoretical contributions of this study to examine how 
international rivers are constructed as political objects based on specific spatial assumptions. Further 
work could also examine how top-down nation-building processes are intertwined with the 
construction of large hydraulic infrastructures, and consequently, with transboundary water politics. 
More discussions in this direction might further enrich key debates in critical geopolitics and 
hydropolitics, bringing attention to discursive practices of othering and the rationale and justifications 
behind them.  
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1 Derg is the short name for the ‘Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army’. 
2 Polis is the transliteration of the Greek word πόλις, which defined the city-state, the dominant political unit in 
the ancient Greek world.  
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3 The content of this website was downloaded in full on March 27, 2015 and therefore the author can easily 
access it even though the website went offline a few weeks after this date, presumably in April 2015.  
4 Gramsci (1975) ascribed to this category the intellectuals organically tied with those in power, in contrast with 
the traditional intellectuals, who consider themselves autonomous and independent from the dominant social 
group.  
5 Due to a different calendar system Ethiopia celebrated the turn of the millennium in 2007.  
